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Those educated earn more than those less educated on
average. There are at least three possible explanations for
this phenomenon. Firstly, the human capital approach argues
that education creates marketable skills which in -turn
enhances the labor earnings. However, the link between
education and productivity is rarely observed. Secondly,
credentalism regards the higher pay received by the more
educated merely due to the possession of credentials rather
than the actual skill acquired. Thirdly, the screening
hypothesis treats education as a predictor of pre-existing
ability. The purpose of this paper is to study empirically
the screening hypothesis for the case of Hong Kong. We
employ Riley's testing procedures for its minimal in data
requirements. It turns out that our empirical findings
provide only a mild support for the screening hypothesis. In
fact, screening is exercised only in a limited numbers of
occupations. It implies that the determination of earnings
in most occupations can be explained by the human, capital
investment. The study also extends to correct the sample
selection bias embodied in Riley's testing procedures. A
two-stage estimation procedure is -then employed and the
result shows that our empirical results are not too much
affected by the selection bias.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to express my
gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Y.C. Wong, whose
guidance, encouragement and suggestions throughout the
writing of this thesis will always be remembered and
appreciated. I owe additional thanks to Mr. Henry Ho for his
computer advice in this empirical study. Last but not least,
I am also indebted to Miss Linda Yu for her encouragement
and advice. Needless to say, I am fully responsible for all
the remaining errors and omissions in this thesis.
S.C. Yu,










AN OVERVIEW OT THE SCREENING HYPOTHESIS 4
Chapter 3
RILEY'S MODEL AND ITS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 17
Chapter 4






Evidence shows that earnings and education are almost
always positively correlated to each other. The theory of
human capital has provided an explanation for this
phenomenon. Central to this approach is that people based on
their rational behavior, do not plan only for immediate
consumption, but also for future pecuniary and non-pecuniary
returns as well. Therefore, by forgoing all or part of their
potential earnings capacity1, they will invest in human
capital in order to enhance their productivity and secure a
larger gain in the future. Several implications follow from
this approach. Firstly, labor market earnings depend
directly on the amount of human capital that an individual
possesses. Secondly, the difference in human capital
reflects the underlying distribution of opportunities and
abilities facing each individual. Thirdly, since education
is one form of human capital investments by which an
individual's skill and productivity can be enhanced, the
more educated should earn more than those with less
education when all other relevant factors such as experience
are held constant. In short, the positive relationship of
schooling and earnings is implied from the productivity
augmenting role of education.
The key linking up productivity with schooling is
however a black box concept. No one has observed a unit of
human capital or has been able to directly measure the
amount of human capital acquired in college or on-the-job
training.2 This lack of observability has- given rise to
alternative explanations for the same observed empirical
phenomenon. These alternative explanations include the
credentialist approach and the educational signalling model
are considered in Chapter 2. The theories of credentialism,
screening and signalling are quite similar in general. Our
focus will be mainly on empirical tests of the screening
hypothesis. As a whole, the accumulated empirical evidence
for or against the screening hypothesis is far from
overwhelming. Therefore, the basic aim of this thesis is to
study empirically the screening hypothesis for the case of
Hong Kong. For the empirical study of Hong Kong, we lack
detailed data used by other economists in their studies of
educational screening, therefore we adopt Riley's model
because of its minimal data requirements. In addition, Riley
's testing procedures are more theoretically appealing than
the previous studies because the notion of signalling
competitive equilibrium is explicitly incorporated into the
model. In Chapter 3, we will summarize the essence of
Riley's theoretical framework. The empirical findings of
Riley's model for the case of Hong Kong will be discussed in
Chapter 4. In the main, our results show that screening by
education is unimportant for most of the occupations in Hong
Kong.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1:
(l)It is plausible to assume that an individual will
devote all his potential earnings capacity to the production
of human capital at school. After leaving school, he will
only wish to forego a certain fraction of it in post-school
investment.
(2)See for example, Blaug(1980) and Silbert(1985)
CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF THE SCREENING HYPOTHESIS
Section 1: The theory of screening and credentialism
The productive role of education, as emphasized by the
human capital theory, has been criticized from the point of
view of screening and credentialism. It seems that both
theories are capable of explaining the same positive
relationship between earnings and schooling. However, the
screening hypothesis can provide a better economic reasoning
for that relationship. Before discussing the screening
hypothesis, it is useful to outline the theory of
'credentialism' which argues that education enhances an
individual's labor earnings without raising his
productivity.
Credentalism, as proposed by non-economists in the
main, argues that a degree acts as a method of selection
among the supply of applicants for certain high paid jobs.
The higher pay received by the more educated then reflects
the possession of credentials rather than the actual skills
associated with it. In this sense, the higher earnings
enjoyed by the more educated is due to the education
barriers which exclude those less educated, but equally
efficient, from entering the high-paying occupations.
The above explanation for the correlation between
earnings and schooling is by no means persuasive to
economists. If college graduates earn more than high school
graduates, the pay differentials must be warranted by the
difference in productivity. Firms would not pay a
substantial higher wage to a college graduate, instead of
employing an equally efficient high school graduate at much
lower costs. Unless the costs of discovering the
productivity of workers are so prohibitively high which
prevent any meaningful assessment of the productivity of
workers. Otherwise, there is no reason for profit-seeking
employers to sacrifice their profits by paying wages premia
merely for sheepskins. In fact, it is more likely to be a
credentialism based on class and family than on education.
A more sophisticated argument of labor earnings
determination, the screening hypothesis, was firstly
proposed by economists such as Spence(1973), Arrow(1973) and
Stiglitz(1975). The screening hypothesis regards the
process of hiring workers as a species of a larger genus,
that is, the problem of selecting buyers or sellers under
imperfect information about their characteristics.1 In his
seminal paper, Spence(1973) begins his argument by
incorporating information costs into his model. He observes
that employers find it very difficult to know accurately the
future productivity of a worker when hiring him.
Furthermore, such kind of information will not be available
to the employer immediately after employment. Firms must
look for an ideal observable trait to infer other
unobservable traits related to productivity. Education, in
this case, is an ideal trait because it can be acquired and
the cost of acquiring it is negatively correlated with ones
productivity. Employers, interpret the education as a signal
for productivity and are willing to pay more for the college
graduates. Since it is plausible that the more able can
acquire a higher education level at lower costs, hence,
given the wage differentials, they will attend colleges and
the colleges diplomas would then be an effective signal of
productivity. In this situation, workers self-select
themselves into educational categories according to their
ability and employers find that the high pay given to
educated workers is justified by their higher productivity.
Once established, the equilibrium tends to be self-
fulfilling.
This signalling model has raised questions about the
efficiency of market determination of educational
investment. Note that in a signalling equilibrium, the
social and private rate of returns are different when
education acts as a signal for innate ability. If laborers
are perfect substitutes for each other, education will be
socially valueless for there is no return from improving the
information about individuals productivity. There will be
an overinvestment in education since the net output is
reduced by the cost of education as compared with a
situation in which no education takes place. Efficiency
issues become more complicated if the allocation of high
and low ability workers matters. A digression is made here
to discuss the three main components of social returns
implied by the screening hypothesis.
The first component of social returns is from the job
assignment.3 If laborers are complementary in production
and differ in their productivity according to what types of
job they perform. Then there are social returns from
education since people of different abilities can be sorted
out and assigned to the jobs with the greatest marginal
productivity. The second component according to Stiglitz4 is
group homogeneity. Output will be maximized if laborers of
similar productivity can be grouped together. For example,
instead of having the speed of production slowed down by the
less able within the production line, we would have greater
output if we had two assembly lines, one with slow workers
and the other with fast workers. The third component
concerns the use of screening not only to reduce the intra-
firm inputs misallocation, but also the inter-firm
misallocation in the sense of ex-post variation in the
marginal product of identical inputs.5
Signalling theories have also attracted critics. For
example, it may be argued that a long-run performance
contract offered by firms can shift the information costs
to be borne by the potential employees. However, unless the
employees are risk-neutral and are perfectly certain of
their ability, such a kind of contract will not be accepted.
Employers, according to Stiglitz, will not invest in on-the-
job evaluation for the difficulty of keeping such
information secret and the possibility that the more able
workers will then be bid away by other competitors.
Section 2: Previous tests of the screening hypothesis
To test what education does, it is necessary to present
the screening hypothesis in a testable theory. We first
start with the test proposed by Taubman and Wales (1973) and
their empirical findings are in support of the screening
hypothesis. They argue that ...if education is being used
to screen people out of high-paying occupations, we must
show that some people with low education are not in the
occupation in which their marginal product and earnings are
highest but that highly educated people are allocated
properly.6 They suggest that by comparing the actual
distribution of the number of people in a particular
occupation with the expected distribution that would exist
in the absence of screening, the existence of screening can
be certified.7 From their findings, very few people at any
educational level will choose the low-paying occupations and
the expected distribution is much lower than the actual
distribution for those with high school level. For high-
paying occupations, the number of college graduates is
approximately the same as under the free-entry assumption,
while for those with high school level, the actual
distribution is less than the expected distribution. Taubman
and Wales then conclude that screening does exist, and under
free entry, the private returns to education would have been
up to one half lower than what they actually are.
However, the results from the Taubman and Wales study
are not conclusive in supporting the screening hypothesis
owing to the problems embodied in their analysis. Firstly,
in calculating the wage rate of a worker in other
occupations, Taubman and Wales employ the marginal
productivity theory, assuming that productivity can be
measured accurately. As a result, worker is paid for his
marginal productivity once being employed. But to
screenists, screening arises because of market failure.. ir
providing the required information about the marginal
productivity of the workers. In the Taubman and Wales
analysis, education merely acts as a kind of discrimination
rather than as a signalling device as argued by screenists.
Therefore, their approach is to test the validity of
credentialism rather than the screening hypothesis,
Secondly, no left-out variables are assumed in their
earnings functions. Critics have expressed skepticism about
this causal assumption. Thirdly, a similar study by
Haspel (1978) which accounts for non-pecuniary aspects in
the earnings function yields a different result.9
Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) offer a different
definition for the role of education. They note that
Broadly, it[screening] says that the earnings differential
associated with education do not mainly reflect improvements
in individual productivity capacity caused by education but,
rather, employer's use of education to identify preexisting
differences in talent.10 They then suggest three
predictions that can be drawn from the screening hypothesis
which are at variance with the evidence. Firstly, the rate
of return to schooling of the dropouts should be lower than
those who gain credentials- in fact they are not. Secondly,
as employers observe employees over time, better information
about workers productivity will be conveyed to the employer
and their wages should be adjusted accordingly- in fact the
private returns to education do not fall with experience.
The third prediction states that if education acts primarily
as a screening device, then it is possible to create a
cheaper screen.
None of these observations provides convincing evidence
against the screening hypothesis. With respect to the first
prediction, Riley (1979) argues, screenists have never
argued that firms pay exclusive attention to diploma per se
but to a vector of information about education
achievement.11 In addition, in the Taubman and Wales study,
school quality is divided into five levels and those college
dropouts in the top fifth receive more income than college
graduates not in the top fifth. Hence, there is no a priori
reason to believe that the rate of return to schooling of
dropouts should be lower than college graduates. In fact,
some people may choose to become dropouts if they expect
lower returns from schooling investment than alternative
earnings opportunities and this group will tend to raise
the rate of return of schooling to dropouts. Furthermore,
Wise12 (1975) questions whether the certificate is a main
contributor to earnings. In his findings, fields of study,
grades in under-graduate and graduate study and the quality
of schools all show a positive effect on individual
earnings.
The second prediction is based on the assumption that
employers make systematic errors when assessing the ability
of their workers on the basis of schooling. Such an
assumption is not compatible with the screenists view of
signalling equilibrium. Furthermore, one of the crucial role
of education is to allow employer to select employees in
terms of trainability. People with more schooling should be
fast learners and receive on-the-job training more
efficiently and hence higher earnings. Given that schooling
and ability are correlated with post-school investment, it
is not surprising that earnings differentials among
individuals rise with working experience. An empirical
study done by Liu and Wong(1982) shows that relevant test of
wage screening should be based on educational certificates
rather than years of schooling.13
The final prediction argues that the sole role of
education is screening. Screenists have never argued that
education does not enhance productivity. Individuals
continue to attend college and firms continue to offer wage
premiums to college graduates suggest that higher education
must have some important effects on productivity. In
general, there is no priori reason why the screening
hypothesis cannot co-exist with the human capital argument.
A person may invest in education both as a mean to raise
productivity and to act as a signal for preexisting ability.
Another study done by Albrecht (1981) is to examine
directly the question of whether employers use education for
purely informational purposes in their hiring of blue-collar
workers. He employs a probit choice model to estimate the
probability of a person being employed given his education
and information variables. The information is whether the
worker has been recommended by a current company employee.
The main hypothesis to be tested is whether the interaction
term between education and the information variable in the
probit choice model is zero. If screening exists, the
interaction term should be negative since the positive
effect of education will be decreased in the presence of
alternative information. The interaction term from his
finding is negative but quite small in magnitude. Therefore
, the null hypothesis that there is no purely informational
components to the returns of education for the educated
applicants cannot be rejected. However, the education level
possessed by the blue-collar workers may not be high enough
to serve as an information signalling device.14 Therefore,
the empirical results are not very promising.
To summarize, the testing procedures mentioned above
rely heavily on the signalling significance of individual
job applicant and individual employer. Note that the
observed effect of schooling on earnings may consist of both
productivity and signalling components. The empirical
problem is to disentangle the effect of these components on
earnings. Only if we have a perfect measure of innate
ability, otherwise it will mix up with the effect from
schooling in the earning function. However, this information
on individual ability should be available to employers as
well; in this case the use of education as a signal for the
unobservable innate ability seems unnecessary. As a result,
the above empirical tests are not very persuasive indeed.
Kenneth Wolpin (1977) has proposed a different test of
the importance of the screening function of schooling. In
his test, an individual knows his own productivity better
than the potential employers do. He states that, as long as
preschool productivity is a large component of postschool
productivity, individuals who, for whatever reason, need not
identify their productivities before employment have less
incentive to acquire schooling. Therefore, for given innate
productivity, the unscreened worker will acquire less
schooling than the screened worker or, conversely, for given
schooling, the unscreened worker will be of greater innate
productivity, and thus have greater earnings than the
screened worker.15 He restricts his findings to the self-
employed and salaried non-professional workers to represent
the unscreened and screened groups respectively. Wolpin
finds that the self-employed workers earn more than the
salaried workers and this result is consistent with the
prediction of screening hypothesis. The other evidence is
that the average schooling for self-employed in his sample
is 13.95 years, while that of salaried employees is 14.55
years. The average schooling of self-employed is 0.6 year
less than the salaried workers which is too small to be
significant. But Riley(1979) argues that Wolpin's results do
provide a mild support the screening hypothesis if they are
property defined. In his own empirical work, Riley(1979)
chooses a strategy which lets the data speak for
themselves by classifying occupations into screened and
unscreened sectors on the basis of modified Mincerian
earnings function. A test of the screening hypothesis is
based on the comparison of the implied discounted lifetime
earnings-education profile of individuals in the screened
occupations with the unscreened occupations. The theoretical
framework of Riley's testing procedures will be discussed in
the following chapter. Using this test, Riley concludes that
screening is a significant phenomenon.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2:
(l)See for example Spence(1973), Arrow(1973) and
Stilglitz(1975).
(2)The more able workers can acquire education at much
lower costs due to fact like obtaining a scholarship or




(5)See Kenneth I. Wolpin(1977). Assuming there are two
types of labor differ in their productivities, Wolpin argues
that output is maximized when each identical firm(in terms
of production function) employs the same level of skills.
With a perfect screen, the heterogeneity of the workforce
can be reduced and aggregate output will be maximized when
each firm employs the same number of workers from each
group.
(6)See Taubman and Wales(1973) p43
(7)For the computation of the expected distribution of
people in a particular occupation, they first regress
earnings on a number of variables such as education,
ability,and other socio-economic proxies for each occupation
and calculate the individual occupational specific wages
(even the hypothetical wages for those occupations not
currently entered). They then rank the occupations
according the wage calculated and determined the expected
distribution in a particular occupation.
(8)See for example Riley(1979) and Wolpin(1977). Even
Taubman and Wales argue that the ability measures are far
from perfect and if X [a vector for the unmeasured skills]
is more important for performance in one occupation than in
others, we would expect the effect of X on earnings to be
higher in this occupation which in turn should induce more
people with X to choose employment in this occupation. But
unless X is correlated with education, we will estimate an
equal misallocation of people at all education levels.
(9)To Haspel, he makes the assumption that occupations
are chosen not only on the basis of income but also on the
non-pecuniary reward. If screening does exist, it should be
viewed as the exclusion of people from entering the job
which offer the highest level of overall satisfaction (the
different result is observed with the inclusion of the non-
pecuniary elements in the regression function. In the high
school group, not only less people is expected in low-paying
occupations but also in the high-paying occupations, that is
a prediction not in line with the screening hypothesis. For
the college graduate, a large positive deviance between the
expected and actual percentages in the highest status job
category is observed. If education does act as a credential,
we should expect no large deviation of the actual
distribution from the expected distribution since everyone
has already possessed a degree.
(10)See Layard and Psacharopoulos(1974) p985.
(11)See Riley(1979) p230.
(12)See Wise(1975).
(13)Liu and Wong(1982), using Singapore data, have
carried out an empirical test to re-examine the hypothesis
that screening by educational achievement exists, but may
eventually decline as employers gain more and better
information about the true productivity of their employees
through on-the-job training. As different from previous
studies, they argue that wage screening should be based on
educational certificates rather than years of schooling.
Their empirical findings provide strong evidence for the
presence of wage screening. It is also observed that the
rate of return to schooling rises over time, after the first
year of working experience, implies that the relative wage
of more productive individuals rises relative to less
productive individuals over time.
(14)In his study, education attainment is a dichotomous
variable with 'high education' level corresponds only to




RILEY'S MODEL AND ITS EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we summarize the model for the testing
of screening hypothesis presented by Riley (1979). Instead
of distinguishing among applicants for a particular job
according to the amount of ex-ante information selected by
researchers, Riley divides occupations into those for which
productivity may be easily ascertained against those for
which signalling might be perceived more important because
of information costs associated with productivity
measurement. A test of the signalling hypothesis, to Riley,
is to find out what observable difference one should expect
between a class of job in which screening is exercised (the
screened class) and a second class in which it is not (the
unscreened class)
Consider first the screened class. An individual
with unobservable initial ability n can attain a level of
education z by staying in school for the first y years of
his life
(1)
The variable z is assumed to summarize a vector of academic
attributes (class taken, grade average, quality of schools
attended and so on) observed by the employers. The signs of
the partial derivatives indicate that a higher z represents
greater educational attainment and that a person with
greater innate ability n is a fast learner. An additional
assumption is yn2Or which implies that the time required to
achieve a marginal increase in education is lower for those
with higher values of n.
Suppose further that M equals to the discounted present
value of an individual's lifetime productivity at the time
of entering the workforce. It is a function of n and the
education attained before entering the labor force:
(2)
We now consider the screenist view that productivity on
the job is so costly to measure that employers have to make
use of education as a proxy for productivity measurement and
offer a wage contract W(z) based on educational attributes.
After the hiring, the earnings of an individual will be
adjusted up or down to reflect true productivity. The value
of lifetime income L of a type n individual is then
expressed as a geometric weighted average of the initial
predicted productivity M. Discounting this to the beginning
of his schooling life, we have
(3)
A value of close to zero indicates a job in which
information about true productivity accrues only slowly. At
the other extreme, with oL close to unity, employers can
determine the actual productivity of an employee very soon.
Let us assume the same specific form of utility function as
in Riley's formulation:
0 b 1 (4)
on the assumption that individuals exhibits constant
relative risk aversion to uncertainty in their lifetime
income.
Suppose each individual is also uncertain about his
lifetime productivity. For simplicity, we assume beliefs
are unbiased and can be expressed in the multiplicative
form
(5)




With higher incomes offered to those with higher
educational credentials each individual of type n chooses
z(n) to maximize his expected utility, that is,
for all n, z(n) maximizes U[n,z,W(z)] (7)
Of course, (7) is not sufficient for an equilibrium.
What is required in addition is the concept of competitive
signalling equilibrium, that is the employers' prediction
about productivity should be self-confirmed, meaning that,
the gross earnings of those with education level z must be
equal to their marginal product, that is,
wrzfn)l=Mfn,z(n)1. (8)
Expression (7) and (8) define an informationally
consistent lifetime earnings function W(z) such that those
1
with higher n always choose higher levels of the signal.
Taking the logarithm of expression (6) we have
In U=lnf+b[ (l-ta6) lnW(z) +c£lnM(n, z) -ry(n,z)] (9)
Then writing lnW(z)= w(z) and lnM(n,z)= m(n,z) and U is
maximized if and only if In U is maximized. Therefore the
optimal decision of type n is to accumulate educational
credentials z, until the certainly equivalent rate of return
, (l-a£) wz (z)+o6mz is just equal to the marginal opportunity
cost ryz(n,z). This is depicted in Figure 1 for types n and
•«
n, those endowed with the lowest and the highest level of
n. Education level zv and z are informationally consistent
in that the logarithm of lifetime value marginal product,
m(n,z), in each case equal, the logarithm of lifetime
earnings.
For those least able with ability n, they would choose the
same level of education as in the world of costless
information2. However, for all those more able people
, education attainment z(n) is strictly higher than the
z(n) of the unscreened class. The resulting log earning
profile w(z) is therefore flatter than the costless
information profile m(z).3
Now, we come to the comparison of the earnings profile
between screened and unscreened sector. It is assumed that
the two sectors are complementary in production implying
that at least over some interval of education and human
Loaarithm ofw
lifetime earninas
rn (z) log earning:
with costless










Fig. 1.—Lifetime earnings functions
capital, it is profitable to employ individuals in both
screened and unscreened job classifications. Then if type n
chooses a screened job and this type is also employed in an
unscreened job, it must be that his expected utility in each
job class is the same.
Assuming people of unscreened sector face the same
uncertainty about their actual productivity as those in the
screened sector, then the expected utility of a type n
individual can be expressed as
(10)
where M is the discounted value of marginal product of type
n in an unscreened sector.
In the unscreened sector, people of type n maximize
A
(10) by choosing the optimal level of z. Since type n
people is indifferent between the unscreened and screened
sector, we have
f [e~r(n'z)M(n,z) ]b=f{er(n'z)w[z(n)] M[n,z(n) ]o6}b(ll)
Taking logarithm and writing lnM(n,z)= m(n,z), the
equilibrium condition is stated as
m(n,z)-ry(n,z l-oi)w(z,n)+o6m[n, z (n) l-ry[n, z (n
Since z(n) is optimal for type n, we also have
l-c£) w (z,n)+6m2[n, z (n) ryz[n,z(n (12
Furthermore in the signalling equilibrium, market return to
education w„(z) exceeds the private return, it implies that
(13:
Riley lastly assumes the rate of return to education
in screen sector is at least as high as in the unscreened
sector, that is
(14
Combining (13) and (14), we derive
Since the optimal education level in the unscreened sector
must satisfy and by assumption
therefore
(is;
It follows immediately that the log of lifetime
earnings profile in the screened sector lies below the
unscreened sector.
To summarize, the following implications have been
derived: (1) For people of any type n observed in both
sectors, those in the unscreened sector spend fewer years in
school and hence earn lower incomes (discounting to the time
of employment) and (2) for individuals choosing the same
level of education z, income discounted to the time of
employment are higher in the unscreened sector. Ignoring the
quality of the schooling and assume that the time spent in
school is positively correlated with total educational
achievement, we derive the following inference on which the
empirical test is based the empirical test is based: for
any given number of years in school, productivity levels and
hence discounted lifetime earnings are on average higher in
the unscreened sector than in the screened sector.
Notes to CHAPTER 3
(l)To show this, Riley put forward three assumptions
to establish an informationally consistent lifetime earning
function W(z). They are:
(i)the marginal time cost of education yz(n,z) is an
increasing function of z, that is, y„„0?
(ii)the marginal productivity of labor Mz(n,z) is an
increasing function of z, but at a decreasing rate, that is,
Mzz°;
(iii)the percentage increase in productivity associated
with an additional unit of education is greater for those
with higher n (implying Mnz0).
By taking the logarithm of expression (6), we have
;ai
Then writing lnW(z)=w(z) and lnM(n,z)=m(n,z) and U is
maximized if and only if In U is maximized. Therefore




For the case of directly observable productivity, that
is, o6=l, (A2) and (A3) are reduced to
(A4
(A5)
Totally differentiating (A4) with respect to n yields
(A6)
Since we assume Mzz0 and yzz0, a unique maximization value
of z should be observed. In addition, Mnz0 and ynz0,
therefore dzdn0, showing that optimal level of education
is a strictly increasing function of n if marginal
productivity can be observed costlessly.
Consider the case that information about the actual
productivity is conveyed to the employer very slowly after
recruitment, so thatol.
The optimal decision of type n individual is to accumulate
education credentials z until
that is equation (A2)




that is those with more innate abilities n will acquire
hiaher educational credentials.
(2)As argued by Stiglitz, if we have sorted out all
except for the least capable, we have also sorted out the
least capable since there is no economic interest for them
to provide information about their productivities. A more
rigorious argument is provided by Riley(1975) concerning the
competitive signalling equlibrium. He argues, [there is
only one Pareto-dominating equlibrium under which] all
individuals are seen to be investing in education to a level
where marginal costs exceeds marginal social products,
except the least able who invest as they would in a world of
free information.
(3)Furthermore differentiating lnW(z)=lnM(n,z) with




But if M were costlessly observed individuals would choose z
in order to make the left hand side of (A12) equals to zero.
Since by assumptions ,w„z0 and yzz0, z(n) of the screened
sector will be strictly higher than that of unscreened
sector.
CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL TEST OF RILEY'S MODEL
According to Riley's model, four major tests of the
screening hypothesis are discussed and their empirical
findings are given in Section 2. We will also present our
findings together with the studies done by Riley and Shah
for comparison. However, Riley's test may be subject to
sample selection bias and in Section 3, a two-stage
estimation method is proposed to correct the bias. The
implication from the empirical study of Hong Kong will be
presented in the last section. A brief discussion of our
data is necessitated and will be mentioned in Section 1.
Section 1: Data
Our data base is from the 1100 sample of the 1976 By-
Census of the Hong Kong population. Only males who were born
in Hong Kong or China are included in our study. To obtain a
homogeneous sample, we exclude those who are working in the
following three kinds of occupations: (1) Foreign and
Commonwealth diplomats, consuls, commissioners, trade
commissioners and their non-local staffs, (2) Members of
Armed Force, (3) Reported occupations that are
unidentifiable or inadequately described. This reduces the
sample size to 106131 observations and 153 occupations (at
three digit level occupational code) are left.
Section 2: Tests and Results
(1) The first test consists of a comparison of the
implied discounted lifetime earnings-education profile of
individuals in the screened occupations with the unscreened
occupations. Riley's theory predicts that the discounted
lifetime earnings-education profile of the latter group lies
above the former.
Suppose that two such groups are somehow identified,
and the following modified Mincerian log-earnings function
of schooling, experience and a vector of controlling socio¬
economic dummies, is estimated for each group:
In Earnings k0+ki.education+k2.education +k2.experience
+k4.experience2+k5.(educationexperience)
+1. Xj_+mj. yj (17)
where Xj_ refers to the economic activity dummies and yj the
marital status dummies, x includes the categories of Self-
employed (hawking), Self-employed (others), Employer,
Employee in the Government sector, Employee (including paid
family worker) in the private sector and Outworker, yj
includes the categories of Single, Married, Widowed and
Divorced Separated.1
Suppose also that labor productivity rises from year to
year at a constant rate 0 and that individuals face an
interest rate of r. Hence, the discount rate R is the
difference between and r. Then the discounted lifetime








Utilizing the log earnings function parameter estimates, we
can obtain an estimate of W(z). A comparison of the lifetime
earnings-education profiles for the two groups then provides
a test of the educational screening hypothesis.
Therefore the first goal in our study is to subdivide
our sample into unscreened and screened occupations. But
there is no clear way of isolating the two sets of
occupations in ex-ante sense. One of main features of
Riley's model is that there is no need to use ex-ante
intuition to classify the occupations into screened and
unscreened categories. Following Riley's method, we assume
that the log-earnings functions are identical across
occupations except for a vector of dummies which shift the




where o refers to the occupation dummies. Estimated
coefficients are reported in Table 1.
TABLE 1
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Note: 1.Absolute t values in parenthesses
2.The fitted equation consists of 152 occupation
dummies
Given the occupation dummies restriction, a higher
coefficient for the occupation dummies implies a higher
lifetime earnings function. Based on the estimated equation
with 152 occupation dummies, we divide the whole sample into
four subsamples according to the estimated occupational
intercept and mean education levels:
Subsample I -high occupation intercept,low mean education
Subsample II -low occupation intercept,low mean education
Subsample III -low occupation intercept,high mean education
Subsample IV -high occupation intercept,high mean education
13 years of education and the intercept of -0.7 are taken
««
as the cutoff point to divide the whole sample into four
subsamples.2
In the previous chapter it is argued that individuals
choosing the screened jobs have the alternative of
unscreened jobs at lower education levels with a higher
discounted lifetime earnings. This means subsamples I and
III are of particular interest. If screening is an important
phenomenon, it should be more evident in subsample III.
The occupations comprising these subsamples are listed
in Appendix 1. Subsample III has 7 occupations and subsample
I has 11 occupations. Clearly a slight shifting of the years
of education and the intercept cut-off points would result
in very few occupations in either subsample.
A description of the sample statistics is contained in
the Appendix 2. From the sample statistics, it is
interesting to note that the ratio of self-employed to the
salaried workers in subsample I is larger than that of
subsample III. For subsamples II and IV, such ratio lies
between that of subsamples I and III. According to the
screening hypothesis, it is argued that the self-employed
are mostly the unscreened individuals. Therefore, one should
observe the largest ratio in subsample I and the smallest in
subsample III.
Separate earnings functions are estimated for each of
the two subsamples and the results are presented in Table 2.
The implied discounted lifetime earnings-education profiles
for both subsample I and III as depicted in Figure 2 are
under the assumption that an individuals face a discount
rate of 5% and the retirement age is 60. From Figure 2, the
earnings profile obtained from subsample I lies above that
of subsample III and thus supports the screening hypothesis.
However, as mentioned above, there are only 7 occupations in
subsample III, besides, it contains less than 2.5% of the
total number of people among the whole sample. This can
hardly provide a conclusive support for the screening
hypothesis. In Riley's study, the discounted lifetime
earnings-education profile for the unscreened group lies
above the screened group. However, in Shah's study, the
discounted lifetime earnings-education profile of the
unscreened group lies above the screened group at the lower
levels of education but the reverse is observed in the
higher education levels.
TABLE 2
OLS Estimates of Earnings Functions




























































































































(2) In Riley's model, it is assumed that an individual
is indifferent between an unscreened job with less education
but a higher discounted lifetime earnings and a screened
job requiring more education but a lower discounted lifetime
earnings. One should therefore observe a negative
correlation between the estimated occupation intercepts and
the means education levels. In our study, the 153
occupations are ranked by the intercept and education level
and the Spearman's rank correlation is computed. The ratio
appears to be positive (0.69671) and statistically
significant. The coefficient still remains as positive and
statistically significant when the occupations with higher
levels of education are included4. Again this evidence is
against the screening hypothesis. In both the Riley and Shah
findings, the Spearman's rank correlation is positive and
statistically significant for the whole sample. It becomes
negative and statistically significant only in the upper
end of the education distribution.
(3) The third test is a comparison of the R2 statistics
between the two subsamples. If we argue subsample III is the
screened group, the estimated earnings functions should fit
the data better. The empirical findings from Table 2
supports this assertion. The R2 statistics for subsample
III is 0.3 362 as compared with 0.1766 in subsample I. The
R2 statistics of 0.1766 for subsample I is rather low, but
one should also focus on the significance of the individual
coefficient. The same conclusion is derived from the R2
statistics in both the Riley and Shah studies.
(4) One of the predictions from Riley's model is that
the coefficient for the self-employed dummy should be
positive. Following Kenneth Wolpin's argument discussed in
Chapter 2, given the same innate ability, the self-employed
workers know their productivity better than potential
employers and have less incentive to acquire more schooling.
Therefore given the same level of schooling, the self-
employed workers must be people of superior productivity and
hence unscreened workers earn more than the employed
workers. From Table 1, the coefficient for self-employed
hawkers, self-employed others and employers appears to be
positive and statistically significant for the whole sample.
But the coefficient for the employees in the Government
sector also turns out to be positive, statistically
significant and numerically larger than our self-employed
dummies and hence contradicts the screening hypothesis. When
we examine subsample I and III from Table 2, the self-
employed coefficient in subsample I is positive but not
statistically significant. It is in subsample III that self-
employed dummies is both positive and statistically
significant. But the coefficient of the self-employed
(others) is numerically smaller than that of employees in
both the government and private sector. Though the
coefficient of employers is numerically the largest among
the economic activity dummies, it must be borne in mind that
the employers earn more because of other factors such as
greater risk. As a result, the prediction from the screening
hypothesis is at variance with the empirical evidence. On
the contrary, the coefficient of the self-employed dummy in
Shah's study is both positive and statistically significant
in the screened and unscreened group. For Riley's study,
the coefficient of self-employed dummy is only positive and
statistically significant for the screened individuals.
Section 4: Selection bias of Riley's model
The estimation of earnings functions for two subsamples
must bear in mind that individuals choose to enter a
particular occupation is deliberately and not randomly. It
then implies that the division of the occupations into four
subsamples is a self-selection process. Therefore a two-
stage estimation procedure is employed to correct for the
selection bias. The specific model used here is due to
Lee(1983) who developed a tractable method for correcting
selectivity bias in models with polychotomous choice. So, we
first start with the multinomial logit choice model to
estimate the odds of being in a particular subsample
relative to another using the maximum likelihood method.










where x and yj refer to same vector of socio-economic
dummies listed in equation (17) and
subscript 1= subsample 1
subscript 2= subsample 2
subscript 3= subsample 3
subscript 4= subsample 4
and the estimated coefficients are given in Table 3
The estimated parameters are then employed to construct
a correction factor, which is used as a regressor in the
earnings function. Lee(1983) has shown that the correction
A A
factor, Sj,for each individual,i, is p [Jj (P) ]Fj (P), where
where j is the number of alternatives, the cumulative
distribution function and fi and J are the
density function and distribution function of the standard



























































Note: 1. Asymptotic standard errors in parenthese:
2. Sample size= 106131
parameters of the earnings functions will be consistent.
The subsamples I and III are then re-estimated using OLS and
including 13 as independent variable. The results are listed
in Table 4. We find that the factor is not statistically
significant and parameters estimated are similar to those
listed in Table 2. This means that the sample selection
bias is insignificant, we conclude that empirical findings
from the testing procedures suggested by Riley are not too
much affected by the sample selection bias when applied to
the case of Hong Kong.
Section 4: Concluding remark
From the above empirical study and analysis, what can
we say about education as a screening device? The bulk of
evidence from our study, except the R2 statistics, cannot
provide a strong support for the educational screening
hypothesis. Our test of the screening hypothesis is based on
direct comparison between occupations characterized by high
education level and low earnings (subsample III) versus
those with low education level and high earnings (subsample
I). As depicted in Figure 3, most of the occupations are
clustered in a pattern which education level positively
correlated with coefficients of occupational intercept.
Therefore in dividing our whole sample into two subsamples,
we must be cautious in choosing the cut-off point for
education level and the coefficients of occupational
TABLE 4
OLS ESTIMATE EARNINGS FUNCTIONS












































































































intercept. A too high or too low cut-off point may render
the numbers of occupations in the two subsamples remarkably
small.
Hence, we conclude that if screening does exist, it is
only exercised in a limited number of occupations and we are
left with the result that earnings determination of most
occupations are not explained by screening. Since most
occupations are not characterized either as belonging to the
screened or unscreened sector, therefore the human capital
approach probably has a more important role in explaining
the earnings determination.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4:
(l)In our study, the levels of formal educational
attainment are divided into University(graduate),
University(non-graduate), Matriculation, Upper secondary,
Lower secondary, Upper primary, Lower primary, Kindergarten
and no schooling. The education achievement is then
transferred into years of education of 18, 17, 15, 13,
11,8,6,2 and 0 respectively. In addition to formal schooling
mentioned above, the total years of education include the
time spent on technical and vocational trainings undertaken
at the education institutions such as Trade school,
Commercial school, Polytechnic, Technical Institute and
College of Education or Department of Education in
University. Years of experience is equal to age minus years
of schooling minus 4 and is entered in the equation to
account for post-school investment.
(2)The mean education for whole sample is 9.2 years and
instead 13 years of education is used so as to provide an
informative division for the reason that people with this
education attainment is equal to upper secondary level and
suppose to possess a Hong Kong Certificate of Education.
Since most jobs will require a minimum completion of
secondary education, therefore 13 years of education could
provide a more meaningful cut-off point for higher and lower
education. In addition, people in the screened group then
possess a certificate which can be serve as a signalling
device. The intercept cut-off point is taken as -0.7. In
addition, such a cut-off point is taken for the education
and intercept in order to allow a sufficient number of
occupations falling in the subsample I and III.
(3)In calculating the ratio of the self-employed to the
salaried workers, we group the outworkers, self-employed
(hawking), self-employed(others) and employers as self-
employed while the employees in both the government and
private sectors as salaried workers. The ratios for
subsample I, II,III and IV are 0.568, 0.171, 0.142 and 0.395
respectively.
(4)The Spearman's rank correlation coefficients for
years of schooling greater and equal to 11, 13 and 15 are
0.67163, 0.61731 and 0.63766 respectively. All coefficients
are statistically significant.
APPENDIX 1
OCCUPATIONS COMPRISING SUBSAMPLE I AND III
Subsample III fLow intercepts and high mean education
(1)Nurses,raidwives, dressers, herbalists, physiotherapists,
occupational therapists, and optometrists.
(2)Medical assistants, dental assistants, veterinary
assistants, pharmaceutical assistants, medical X-ray
technicians, and related workers.
(3)Teachers not else classified.
(4)Member of religious orders (excluding those performing
non-religious functions such as nursing, teaching social
work, and other lay-workers).
(5)Authors, critics, editors, reporters and related workers.
(6)Stenographers, typists (including audio typists and
teletypist) and verbatim reporters.
(7)Costing computing clerks, wages clerks, and finance
clerks.
Subsample I fhicrh intercepts and low mean education)
(1)Composers, musicians, singers, dancers, actors, stage
directors, producers, and radio and T.V. announcers.
(2)Athletic coaches and professional jockeys or trainers.
(3)Railway station masters, railway station supervisors,
train dispatchers, bus inspectors, ferry inspectors, air
traffic controllers, flight operations officers,
postmasters, postal service supervisors, and
telecommunication supervisors.
(4)Telephone switchboard operators, radio-telephone
operators and telegraphers.
(5)Managers and working proprietors of wholesale and retail
trade(except import and export).
(6)Insurance salesmen, real estate salesmen, securities
salesmen, advertising salesmen, auctioneers and appraisers.
(7)Managers and working proprietors of hotels, restaurants
,guest house, cafeterias, bars, cafes, discotheques and
dance halls.
•1
(8)Policemen, detectives and guards.
(9)Fire Brigade and other disciplined protective service




DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE STATISTICS
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